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   Introduction 
Risk and uncertainty are not new concepts to producers and processors operating in the 
agricultural sector. Over the years they have employed various risk management tools and 
strategies to help mitigate risk. Some of those tools are options and futures markets, marketing 
contracts, production contracts, crop insurance, and participation in governmental programs. 
These tools help them manage both input cost and output prices. A more difficult situation arises 
when producers and processors have to figure out how to manage uncertainty.  
According to Knight (1921) and Chavas (2004) uncertainty occurs when a priori 
information about a probability distribution is unknown. Sources of uncertainty in agribusiness 
can be categorized into: Business/Operational, Financial, Market Conditions, Technology, 
Business Relationships, and Policy & Regulation (Detre et al., 2006). Tools and strategies for 
producers and processors to handle uncertainty are far less developed when compared to risk 
management tools and strategies. One method that has been gaining traction in many industries 
for evaluating uncertainty and which shows promise in the agricultural sector is Real Options 
Analysis (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Amran and Kulatilaka, 1999; Boehlje, 2003)  . The objective 
of this study is to use Real Options Analysis to evaluate the uncertainty surrounding the 
development of the cellulosic ethanol industry in Louisiana, which has significant potential to 
produce biomass that can be converted to ethanol via the cellulosic production process.  
For this industry to develop it is going to take a significant investment by cellulosic 
ethanol processors, in terms of both capital investments and long-term contracts with producers. 
Currently, the ethanol industry is receiving subsidies for the production of ethanol as well as  
protection, via tariffs from imports, and mandates. This makes ethanol production an attractive 
investment. These types of protectionary measures are typically used to help protect infant industries (Johnson and Runge, 2007). Historically, the infant industry argument has been made 
and accepted as an exception to the rationale for free trade (Sheldon, 2008). It is likely that, at 
some point in the future, typically when the industry has become economically viable, the 
subsidies, tariffs, and mandates will be removed.  This introduces two additional sources of 
uncertainty for processor and producers interested in the Louisiana cellulosic ethanol market: 1.) 
When will the ethanol industry be deemed viable? and 2.) How will the removal of the subsidies 
and governmental protection occur? 
   Since cellulosic ethanol is currently not cost competitive when compared to conventional 
ethanol, potential processors are dependent upon these subsidies remaining in place, at least for 
the foreseeable future, until substantial gains in reducing input costs are achieved (Wyman, 
2007). In recent years, subsidies were removed from biodiesel, even before it reached the 
maturity level of ethanol, which further compounds the uncertainty surrounding government 
support of the industry. Though the tax credit was later replaced, producing firms suffered from 
the effects of an uncertain future, and many shut down either temporarily or permanently 
(Gerpen, 2005).  
The model developed in this paper can serve as a decision tool for processors who need 
to examine a variety of future scenarios to help them determine under what conditions they are 
willing to make an investment in the cellulosic ethanol industry. More importantly this model 
can likely serve as a framework for Real Options Analysis in other infant agricultural industries. 
Ethanol 
Supplying the current and future market for renewable energy in the United States will require a 
large basket of energy sources from many different technologies.  In the liquid fuels sector, 
ethanol has a large role to play and will have an increasingly important role in the next decade.  While the vast majority of this country‟s ethanol is currently produced from corn, this is by no 
means the only option.  With the rise of cellulosic ethanol, many alternatives open up, including 
the production of fuel from sugarcane waste fiber.  Additionally, ethanol can be obtained from 
sugar-bearing crops like sugarcane and sugar beets. 
In February of 2010, the EPA finally concluded its years-long review of the original RFS and 
released its new standard, the RFS2. The long-term goals of producing domestic ethanol didn‟t 
change, and the short-term production targets were only changed modestly.  However, there is 
one major change that is relevant to this study.  Under the RFS, there is a category of biofuel 
called “advanced biofuel,” a designation that includes ethanol from sugarcane juice. Since the 
RFS standards call for 21 billion gallons of advanced biofuels by 2022, and 16 billion gallons of 
that from cellulosic ethanol, that leaves a 5 billion gallon mandate for other advanced biofuels 
that could be filled by ethanol from sugarcane juice. 
Sugarcane 
Of particular interest to Louisiana is the possibility of producing commercially-viable quantities 
of ethanol from sugarcane.  There are several possible mechanisms by which this might be 
accomplished, but the two that have been most frequently explored are “juice” ethanol, obtained 
by fermenting high-sugar cane juice, and cellulose or biomass ethanol, which is obtained via an 
enzymatic process performed on the biomass portion of the crop.  
While sugar-based ethanol is certainly an interesting possibility and a proven technology, 
cellulosic ethanol might be the most tempting prospect, due to the large quantities of bagasse 
(waste fiber) produced as a byproduct of the sugarcane milling process.  This is one of the 
primary benefits of locating a cellulosic ethanol plant in Louisiana.  This fiber is generally 
burned at the mill, producing enough steam power to make the plant energy self-sufficient, but there is usually 10-20% excess bagasse that must be disposed of.  Since that bagasse currently 
has no value, using it to make ethanol represents a value-add to the mill.  
It is not yet clear how cost-effective a cellulosic ethanol process would be using the full 
sugarcane stalk, but the biomass content of traditionally harvested varieties is not likely to be 
high enough for the ethanol produced to be an economically feasible product on its own.  There 
are other varieties that are currently being developed that have much higher biomass yields 
however, and a full-plant cellulosic ethanol process may indeed end up being a viable option 
using some of these “energy cane” varieties.   
These energy cane varieties represent a large risk for the farmer though, since they 
contain very low levels of sugar and could not therefore be efficiently ground for sugar 
production.  In order for the farmer to actually be able to switch to energy cane, he would have to 
be able to generate as much revenue from the ethanol produced as he gives up in lost sugar 
revenue.  Whether or not this could happen is dependent upon market prices for sugar and 
ethanol, as well as pricing strategies employed by biofuels producers, and the uncertainty in the 
market makes it unlikely that any farmers will switch to energy cane in the short term, at least 
until the production technology is proven.  This presents a problem for a processor who is 
interested in building a cellulosic ethanol plant, as no viable feedstocks will be available for 
processing in the short term.  The planting cycle for all cane varieties means that a processor 
would likely be stuck with the current low-biomass varieties for at least one or two years, and 
possibly longer. 
To guarantee a ready feedstock supply from a risk-averse producer, a hypothetical 
cellulosic ethanol plant would have to guarantee revenue that is at least equal to that which the 
producer would have made had his energy crop acres stayed in sugarcane.  Because of the long planting cycle of all sugarcane varieties (including energy cane), the processor will have to 
contract for the energy cane at least four years before he intends to produce any ethanol from the 
new crop, and seven years before he intends to be producing at full capacity.  The planting cycle 
for cane can be seen in Figure 1.   
Until then, sweet sorghum offers an additional route of feedstock diversification.  As an 
annual crop, it represents less of a commitment to the producer and is something that can be 
contracted for on a yearly basis.  Further, sorghum stocks could potentially be added to the 
plant‟s input stream starting in the first year, given its short lifecycle.  Sweet sorghum growth in 
south Louisiana has not been studied quite as much as energy cane has, but there is enough to 
suppose that it could be a reliable energy crop. (Viator et al., 2009). 
The mill 
If a small cellulosic ethanol plant were available at the sugar mill, ethanol could be produced 
from some or all of the on-site bagasse, which would not affect the raw sugar or molasses 
generated by the mill.  Given a representative mill that grinds 12,000 tons of cane per day during 
the harvest season, about 15,000 gallons of ethanol could be produced per day from the mill‟s 
excess bagasse (Day, 2010).  This would represent about a 6 million gallon annual capacity, if 
the bagasse were available year-round.  If all of the onsite bagasse were used to make ethanol, 
this figure would be 85,000 gallons daily, or 30 million annually.  In the latter scenario, power 
would have to be generated via some other boiler fuel, such as natural gas.  If the ethanol 
generated from this process had a higher value than the deferred cost of boiler fuel that comes 
from burning the bagasse, then the ethanol plant would be able to generate added value from the 
same sugarcane harvest that it already sees.  If only the excess were made into ethanol, the entire process would be a value-add, though external feedstocks are required in order for the plant to 
reach commercial levels of production.   
For this research, the initial plant is modeled as a 10 million gallon plant capable of 
running on 100% bagasse if necessary, but with a preference to run on a combination of bagasse 
and harvested feedstocks.  Based on existing corn ethanol plants and on NREL models for 
cellulosic ethanol, a full-size plant producing commercially-viable quantities of ethanol is also 
designed, with an annual capacity of 70 million gallons.  This is modeled separately, as an 
expansion to the smaller plant.  The risk portfolio for the mill changes significantly when 
switching between these two plants for two major reasons.  Firstly, the smaller plant can run 
strictly on bagasse if necessary, while the larger plant must have a ready supply of energy crops 
or other non-bagasse feedstocks in order to run profitably.  Secondly, the sugar mill with the 
smaller collocated plant still draws most of its revenue from sugar, limiting its exposure to the 
volatility of the ethanol market, while the larger capacity plant would mean that the facility‟s 
largest revenue stream will be from ethanol. 
Dealing with Ethanol Market Uncertainty 
Producers in the agricultural sector deal with risk and uncertainty on a daily basis. They use 
futures and options markets to help truncate downside risks.  These risks and uncertainties are 
then passed on to upstream firms that further process these commodities. A perfect example of 
the uncertainty faced by producers took place in 2008 as floods in Corn Belt destroyed 
significant corn acreages and corn prices increased from $2.00 per bushel to over $6.00 per 
bushel. As a result, of this many ethanol producers went from a financial position of paying off a 
new ethanol plant in six months to some of the ethanol plants entering bankruptcy. One method 
of examining the risk of capital investments is the usage of net present value (NPV). Previously, a net present value analysis was conducted to determine if a sugarmills would benefit from 
additional revenue streams from ethanol from sugar or converting the bagasse into ethanol. 
However, a downfall of NPV analysis is that it fails to accurately capture the economic value of 
investments in an environment of widespread uncertainty and rapid change.  
This is exactly what sugarmills will be facing as they consider the production of ethanol 
to increase the number of revenue streams for the business. Therefore, we propose a real options 
approach to examine the incorporation of an ethanol facility into the primary sugar milling 
business. This approach allows the manager of the mill to determine the proper timing of the 
expansion given widespread uncertainty in this infant market.  
Why Real Options? 
Walters and Giles (2000) state that, while real options analysis (ROA) has some features in 
common with classical NPV analysis, ROA is valuable, “when investment involves an 
irreversible cost in an uncertain environment. And the beneficial asymmetry between the right 
and the obligation to invest under these conditions is what generates the option's value.”  In the 
case of the collocated ethanol plant, there is a clear place where this decision point can be 
examined.  If a cellulosic ethanol plant is going to produce ethanol at a capacity that relies on 
energy cane, it must first contract for the crop and wait for a productive quantity to be available 
for harvest.  Given the long production cycle of sugarcane (and thus energy cane), this 
effectively translates to a four year lag between contracting with the growers and having enough 
cane for the intended plant to run in a cost-effective manner.  Given an assumed two year build 
time for the modeled ethanol plant, this gives us a two year window to observe the market and 
decide whether or not to build the plant.   Translated into real options analysis terminology, this means we‟ve got a European Call 
option to build with an expiration date two years from contracting, a price equal to the amount 
needed to enter into the contract, and an exercise price equal to the cost of building the ethanol 
plant.  For ease of demonstration, we have previously modeled the facility as a representative 
Louisiana sugarmill with a small-scale (10 million gallon/year) ethanol plant located onsite 
which is capable of running strictly on available bagasse if necessary. The operational decision 
will be whether or not to expand this pilot plant to a full-scale cellulosic ethanol facility with an 
annual capacity of approximately 70 million gallons, which could only be sustained if there is 
significant local production of energy cane.   
Objectives 
The objective of this research is to develop an analytical framework that can be used to study the 
potential to collocate cellulosic ethanol processing capabilities within a Louisiana sugarmill in an 
environment of both risk and uncertainty, and to present an alternative valuation method that 
may help decision makers understand the value and risks contained within different economic 
opportunities. 
  The framework should have general value for various types of production and processing 
facilities, but for this research the crops studied are sugarcane, energy cane, and sweet sorghum.  
Sugar is the most reliable source of profit for the sugarmill, and as such it will not be examined 
for processing  into ethanol.  Previous research  has shown that, given the relative  sugar and 
ethanol prices,  it  is unlikely that sugar  juice  from sugarcane could  be profitably turned  into 
ethanol, nor could the primary sugarcane co-product, molasses. 
 Initial Plant 
The  fibrous  sugarcane  byproduct,  bagasse,  can  be  processed  into  ethanol  using  a 
cellulosic process, a process which could also be applied  independently or jointly with other 
available or potential sources of biomass.  It is this step in the processing cycle that we are 
primarily  interested  in.    Specifically,  this  research  examines  the  possibility  of  collocating  a 
cellulosic ethanol processing plant at the same site as a sugar mill, to run initially on the excess 
bagasse from the sugar mill.  The mill could also potentially run additional fibrous feedstocks 
through  the  grinders  and  make  ethanol  from  the  biomass,  and  even  run  sugar  juice  and/or 
molasses through the latter part of the ethanol facility to make conventional ethanol.  Depending 
on the particular situation, this research might also be applicable to other regions that grow and 
process  high-biomass  crops,  such  as  grain  or  forage  sorghum,  miscanthus,  switchgrass,  and 
possibly fast-growing tree species.   
To begin with though, no specially-harvested energy crops will be included in the model, 
only bagasse. The potential benefits of collocating a cellulosic ethanol plant include reduced 
transportation costs when using on-site bagasse, fully-established transportation and unloading 
systems, and the ability to reuse some capital like grinders and storage.  
After the first year, it is assumed that the plant will be able to attract a small number of 
producers, so some production of sweet sorghum and energy cane begins to take place.  To fill 
out the 10 million gallon capacity of the small initial plant, under 10,000 acres of energy crops 
are required, given average expected yields. 
 The Expansion Decision 
In the research that immediately preceded this work, it was shown that this 10 million gallon 
plant is, given expected output parameters, a project worth considering. The downside risks are 
relatively low, even given various shocks to the output parameters, and the existence of a backup 
feedstock like bagasse means that the plant is also fairly insulated from shocks to the input 
parameters.  
  However if the plant wished to expand to a more commercially-standard capacity like 70 
million gallons, some of the advantages disappear, and the plant becomes a more vulnerable 
venture.  With ethanol revenue approaching or exceeding that from sugar, the entire mill is more 
exposed to the market and production conditions.  The decision to expand carries with it unique 
risks and uncertainty, in addition to very large potential benefits. 
  It is this decision that the current research is focused on.  A commercial cellulosic ethanol 
plant is subject to significant levels of uncertainty from many different areas, and of many 
different types.  This research cannot study all possible sources of uncertainty, but will instead 
cover a small number of the most significant sources. 
  Given this uncertainty, the firm has incentive to delay the final decision as long as 
possible.  However, in order to ensure that the plant, after the two year construction time, has 
enough ready feedstock to be able to begin recouping its construction costs, the mill must make 
one other decision prior to the final decision to build the plant.  Specifically, the mill must decide 
to contract with energy cane producers to plant significantly larger amounts of energy cane two 
years prior to the beginning of construction, which results in planting beginning one year prior, 
and capacity being a roughly the break-even amount during the expansion‟s first year of 
operation.     In ROA terms, contracting with the growers for this new higher quantity is the equivalent 
of buying the option to expand capacity. If, during the intervening two years between writing the 
contract and needing to start construction, market conditions or production parameters change 
significantly enough that the expected value of the expansion project turns negative, the mill can 
“let the option expire” by simply not beginning construction. The mill‟s losses are equal to 
whatever it cost to contract with the growers for the expanded quantity. If the mill instead 
decides to exercise the option by building the plant, the potential losses could be much higher.  
The value of the option (to build or not build) is essentially represented by the value saved by 
letting the option expire in a down market instead of building and taking larger losses.  If 
expected conditions are positive, then the mill will exercise the option, and the value of the 
project follows the same value path as traditional NPV analysis. For this reason, only negative 
shocks will be studied in this research. 
  In order for the real option to have value, there must be a significant chance that 
unexpected negative market or production conditions could arise in the years between buying 
and exercising the option.  Since uncertainty is, by its nature, unpredictable, a large range of 
potential negative shock chances will have to be considered. 
  The risks and uncertainty  facing potential cellulosic ethanol producers are an area of 
research that needs to be explored further.  The goal of this research is to model some of the 
uncertainty facing a collocated plant using simulation techniques, and then explore some sources 
of uncertainty to learn more about how they might affect the business decisions facing the plant.  
The following are the objectives of this paper: 
 1)  The primary objective of this paper  is to develop a simulation  model of a  sugarmill 
collocated with a cellulosic ethanol plant capable of running on bagasse, energy cane, 
sweet sorghum, and other cellulosic feedstocks. 
2)  Additionally,  an  expansion  to  this  mill  is  modeled,  bringing  the  capacity  up  to 
commercial scale. 
3)  Using this simulated mill, test the response to uncertainty in production parameters and 
market conditions.  Using Real Options  Analysis, explore the decisions  faced  by the 
operators when negative market shocks are randomly incorporated.   
 
Louisiana sugar mills are one set of stakeholders that would be interested in this research, for 
several reasons. If building an add-on ethanol processing facility would be a profitable endeavor 
that would pay for itself and provide additional revenue streams, this would interest any mill 
owner or cooperative seeking to increase profits. Not only could revenues be increased during 
the traditional sugarcane harvest season, but if other feedstocks were brought in during different 
periods of the year, the mill would be able to increase the period over which it has cash inflows.  
Additionally, the added revenue stream could diversify risk across multiple commodities and 
spread fixed costs out.   
But the uncertainties inherent in the decision to expand to commercial capacity are daunting, 
especially to a sugar mill faced with the potential reality of having ethanol become its primary 
revenue source. Real options analysis can  help  make the strategic decision a simpler one to 
understand. 
Sugarcane  farmers  are  another  group  likely  to  be  interested  in  this  line  of  research.  
Sugarcane acres in Louisiana peaked in 2000 at 465,000, but since then have been decreasing by an average of two percent annually, as shown in Figure 2 (USDA, 2010). Additionally, revenues 
from sugar have been decreasing, as have earnings-per-acre (Salassi and Deliberto, 2006; 2007; 
2008; 2009).    The price of sugar did spike in 2009, but there is no guarantee that it will stay 
elevated for long. Expanding into the ethanol feedstock market would leave sugarcane farmers 
less exposed to changes in the market price of sugar.   
Literature Review 
There are several areas of the literature that are important to understand in order to proceed with 
developing a methodology for this study. 
Net Present Value 
One of the measures by which the tested scenarios will be analyzed is their Net Present Value 
(NPV).  NPV analysis is a technique that is used to determine the total value of a project in 
present cash value, which is arrived at by subtracting initial cash outlays from a discounted set 




  Fn is the net cash flows that can be realized each year 
  Fo is the initial cash outlay 
  N is the planning time span 
  d is the discount rate 
 The cash flow from each year is discounted to its present value, and all of these values are added, 
along  with  the  negative  cashflow  from  the  initial  setup  costs.   If  this  value  is  positive,  the 
investment is acceptable.  If negative, it‟s not acceptable, and if zero it is indifferent.  The size of 
a project‟s NPV can also be used to ranking it against rival projects (Barry, et. al., 2000).  By 
using this tool we can, for instance, determine whether a collocated ethanol facility would be a 
better investment than a similarly-structured stand-alone facility.  This will be used for several 
such comparisons throughout this study. 
  However, NPV and the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) methodology underlying it suffer 
from two basic problems that prevent them from being the primary method by which we analyze 
this  facility.    Firstly,  DCF  is  deterministic  with  respect  to  its  input  values.    As  such,  NPV 
analysis alone cannot incorporate the risks inherent in the real-world probabilistic inputs.  To 
address  this,  a  researcher  can  vary  some  key  inputs  by  fixed  amounts,  which  amounts  to  a 
sensitivity  analysis.    Or, taking  this  a  step  further, the  input  values  can  be  allowed  to  vary 
randomly  over  some  distribution,  and  the  problem  can  be  analyzed  over  thousands  of  such 
random drawings.  Monte Carlo simulation is an effective tool to accomplish this. 
  DCF  and  NPV  analysis  also  assume  a  fixed  path  for  decision  makers.    Because  the 
technique does  not allow  for  management  flexibility,  it  necessarily simplifies what could  be 
extremely complex multi-stage decisions into a simple progression of actions.  This inability to 
react to changing conditions by reanalyzing decisions or even breaking them into multiple stages 
is  a  weakness  than  can  be  addressed  by  the  use  of  Real  Options  Analysis  (Kodukula  and 
Papudesu, 2006). Simulation 
The immaturity of the cellulosic ethanol industry presents a data-availability problem that puts 
some  quantitative  methods  out  of  reach.    However,  this  problem  is  ideally  suited  to  the 
application of simulation techniques.   Additionally, simulation methods can help account for 
random  variation  in  input  variables.  Basic  NPV  analysis  assumes  that  input  values  are 
deterministic  and  free  of  random  variations.  Given  the  nature  of  most  real-world  business 
decisions  however,  actual  inputs  are  generally  probabilistic  and  can  randomly  take  on  large 
ranges or distributions of values.  Monte Carlo simulation is a technique via which an analyst can 
examine the behavior of a system over a very large number of such values (Boyle, 1977).  And 
as Rose (1998) says, “Monte Carlo simulation can be used to value complex real options whose 
payoffs  are  dependent  on  a  project‟s  cash  flows,”  which  is  exactly  how  such  simulation 
techniques are used in this model. 
Richardson, Klose, and Gray (2000) provide a framework for how to handle some of the 
challenges  of  agricultural  simulation  models.  A  major  issue  with  agricultural  data  is  the 
availability  of  data  collected  while  the  same  operational  conditions  apply.  Such  conditions 
include  policy  regimes,  management  practices,  and  farm  or  processor  practices.  Richardson 
(2002) indicates that 20 or more comparable observations are needed to show a distribution is 
normal, something  not likely to be possible  for  most of the agricultural data  for this study.  
Additionally,  to  account  for  the  likely  correlation  of  two  or  more  random  variables,  a 
multivariate empirical (MVE) distribution will be needed (Richardson and Condra, 1978). While 
Richardson,  Klose,  and  Gray  (2000)  suggest  that  the  MVE  distribution  would  be  a  good 
approach for those variables for which there is at least a moderate amount of data, a triangular or 
GRKS distribution is ideal when presented with sparse data, as in Louisiana molasses prices.  Real Options Analysis 
A real option can be defined as “a right – not an obligation – to take an action … on an 
underlying non-financial asset at a predetermined cost on or before a predetermined date” 
(Kodukula and Papudesu, 2006). Purchasing a real option (by making some investment) 
essentially guarantees the purchaser the exclusive right to a particular price for some asset or 
project.  In the absence of the initial investment, the project would either be impossible, or 
available at a significantly different price. 
  If conditions do not change between the purchase and exercise of an option, then the 
outcome is the same as if the situation were a predetermined path as is assumed in NPV analysis. 
However, “Between now and the time of decision, market conditions will change unpredictably, 
making one or the other of the available decisions better for us, and we will have the right to take 
whatever decision will suit us best at the time” (Howell et. al., 2001). 
  According to Courtney (2001), a growth option is one which grants the firm the right to 
capture future upside potential via expansion, and a learning option is one with grants the firm 
the right to postpone a future investment until more information is available.  The expansion 
option studied in this research is a combination of these two option types.  In using a real options 
approach, this model provides a better idea of how a flexible plant manager would actually react 
to new information gained between the purchase of the option to expand and the exercise (or 
expiration) of that option.  DCF and NPV analysis “mechanistically discount back expected cash 
flows, while ROV [Real Options Valuation] starts at the end of the decision tree and works back 
one decision at a time, always asking, „What would an intelligent manager choose to do at this 
point given the flexibility to reoptimize?‟” (Courtney, 2001). Sensitivity Analysis 
When developing a linear programming model or a simulation model, assumptions are made 
about some of the parameters in order to solve the model within the specified constraints.  In 
reality, these assumed-known parameters are simply predictions about future states.  To account 
for the fact that these predictions cannot actually be relied upon, some tests should be conducted 
to  see  how  the  model  might  be  affected  if  some  of  these  parameters  took on  other  values.  
According  to  Hillier  and  Lieberman  (2005)  sensitivity  analysis  serves  exactly  this  function.  
Conducting such an analysis on the various models built in this research will demonstrate which 
variables cannot be changed without changing the solution.  It will also show over what ranges 
other variables can vary without affecting our model solutions. This is valuable not only to show 
which variables must be watched most closely, but also to show how robust the  model is to 
changes in certain market conditions, or how vulnerable.  In addition, sensitivity analysis can 
provide a  more  complete picture of the  value of a real option and  its robustness to various 
parameter shocks.   
Data and Methodology 
The hypothesis that we want to test is whether or not a sugarcane mill with a built-in cellulosic 
ethanol plant could profitably use real options analysis to help make strategic decisions about 
future production capacity in an environment of uncertainty.  
Since no such mill exists, the first goal is to build a simulation model to approximate the 
operations of a sugar mill with a collocated cellulosic ethanol plant of small scale.  Additionally, 
a simulation of a commercial-scale expanded cellulosic ethanol facility will be added on to the 
initial model.  This facility will have the capability to process cellulosic feedstocks into ethanol.    The time period studied will cover 25 years, the limit of EIA‟s forecasts for some important 
inputs like natural gas and crude oil.  Some factors affecting the mill‟s performance are given in 
Appendix A. 
The entire mill and ethanol models are built in Microsoft Excel, and Simetar is used for all 
simulation operations. The MVE model is made up of prices and yields for sugarcane, as well as 
ethanol  and  oil  prices  and  yields  for  energy  crops.  Molasses  data  is  sparse,  so  a  GRKS 
distribution is employed.  Commercial-recoverable sugar (CRS) is simulated using an empirical 
distribution built from 20 years of historical data.  Following Salassi (2008), the actual formulas 
driving the mill simulation are: 
GROSS PROFIT = SALES – COST OF SALES   (1a) 
NET INCOME = GROSS PROFIT – FACTORY EXPENSES  (1b) 
The supporting equations are given in Appendix B. 
The outputs of the mill are raw sugar, molasses, ethanol, and bagasse.  The operations of 
the  mill  itself  are  based  on  existing  mills,  with  data  gathered  from  personal  interviews 
(Schudmak, 2009) and production studies (Salassi and Deliberto, 2010).  On the output side, 
sugar  and  molasses  prices  come  from  ERS,  bagasse  prices  are  taken  from  NREL,  and  EIA 
supplies ethanol prices. Natural gas prices come from EIA and prices for energy crops are based 
on prior studies about crop pricing strategies for energy cane.   
The forecasted yields for sugarcane, energy cane, and sweet sorghum follow the basic 
formula relating yields to the price of fertilizer.  Natural gas is used as a proxy for nitrogen 
fertilizers since sufficient projections are available from EIA.  Additionally, the yields were 
found to have an AR(1) autoregressive process, so a single lag was used, in addition to a time 
trend.  Thus the equation takes the following form:  
                                  (5) 
 
Ethanol prices are forecasted using an AR(1) process as well.  In keeping with historical trends, 
ethanol price was found to be closely correlated to that of oil.  Since EIA maintains projections 
of the price of oil, it was possible to incorporate that into the forecast equation.  The formula 
takes the following form: 
 
                                                        (6) 
 
With the full simulation model, several different issues can be examined.  A sensitivity analysis 
is used to examine how the mill is affected by changes in transportation costs as well as the 
expected prices of sugar and expected production costs for the different energy crops.    
The second objective is to simulate an expanded commercial-capacity cellulosic ethanol 
plant and incorporate this into the initial plant simulation.  This cellulosic ethanol plant, like the 
smaller initial plant, will be modeled on existing plant data from Aden (2002) and Holcomb 
(2009) and some of the process parameters come from personal interviews (Day, 2010).  
Due to the varied nature of the feedstocks involved in the cellulosic ethanol plants, some 
assumptions must be made about acquisition strategy. For the initial plant, it is assumed that, 
after the first full year of production, it will be possible to begin contracting with growers to 
produce energy crops.  Production of sweet sorghum, an annual crop, begins in the second year.  
Planting of energy cane also begins in the second year, but no cane is delivered until the fourth 
year.  To fill out the initial 10 million gallon capacity plant, the operator can run entirely on stored bagasse for the year, but if it is assumed that bagasse is readily available for one quarter of 
the year, then 3,500 acres of sweet sorghum and 5,000 acres of energy cane are enough to supply 
the rest of the year‟s feedstock demand, given average expected yields for both crops.   The 
model reacts dynamically to stochastic energy crop yields by adjusting the quantity of bagasse 
purchased or fiber stored. Low yields stimulate the plant to buy additional bagasse from other 
sugar mills, and higher yields result in excess fiber being stored for up to 6 months. 
For the expanded 70 million gallon plant, the feedstock assumptions change slightly.  At 
that capacity, there would not be enough excess bagasse in the entire state to fill out an entire 
year‟s  worth  of  production,  so  the  plant  will  be  much  more  dependent  on  the  harvested 
feedstocks.  Given expected yields, 20,000 acres of sweet sorghum and about 35,000 acres of 
energy cane should provide enough fiber for the plant to run at between 70% and 85% capacity, 
and the remaining capacity is assumed to be filled with onsite and purchased bagasse, of which 
there should be sufficient quantity to produce at or near full capacity during a normal year. 
The option to expand the plant to the 70 million gallon capacity is a European call option 
to expand.  The purchase price will be discussed below.  At time of exercise, the value of the 
basic option can be given by: 
 
                    (7) 
 
Where S  is the value of the underlying asset, which  is the revenue stream generated by the 
expanded plant, and X is the exercise or strike price, which is the cost of building and operating 
the expansion.  This term, S - X is effectively the net present value of the expansion at the time of the expiration of the option. Given that a smaller version of the plant already exists at the time of 
exercise, the actual value of the expansion option for a given simulation iteration i is given by: 
 
                         (8) 
 
Where NPVx is the value of the expanded plant and NPVo is the value of the original plant, both 
calculated  at  the  time  of  expiration.  The  option  is  considered  in  the  money  if  the  value  is 
positive.  Since the value of the ROV is driven by the underlying NPV model, this value can be 
simulated  over  thousands  of  iterations  and  the  mean  and  standard  deviation  analyzed  over 
different scenarios and parameter assumptions. 
  The option price or premium is the irreversible investment made to purchase the right to 
buy the underlying asset.  In this case, in order to be able to profitably build and operate the 
expanded ethanol plant, the operator must contract with growers of energy cane two years prior 
to the start of construction, which is the expiration date of the option.  The cost of this contract is 
the option price.  Given the high level of risk inherent in planting a perennial crop with no 
alternative market, the risk premium to convince growers to commit large amounts of land to 
energy cane should be very high.  Based on existing contracting habits, it is assumed that the 
growers will have to be guaranteed at least the same level of expected revenue that would have 
been realized had they planted their acreage with sugarcane instead of energy cane.  For this 
reason, the contract takes the form of a guaranteed payment over the contracted period equal to 
the greater of the present value of the energy cane revenue or the present value of the sacrificed 
sugarcane revenue.  If the option is not exercised, the grower will cease production of the energy cane and return all contracted acres to sugarcane, which the mill will buy, realizing a small 
revenue stream from the resulting sugar. So the option price takes the following form: 
(9) 





                            
 
   
                                                                 
                            
 
   
              
 
   
                     
  
Where 
n is the length of contract (seven years in this example) 
PriceECt is the price of energy cane in period t 
QuantityECt is the quantity of energy cane harvested in period t 
PriceSCt is the price of sugarcane in period t 
QuantityTSCt is the total quantity of sugarcane that would have been harvested in period t 
if the total acreage had been in sugarcane from period 0 
RevenueMSCt is the sugar revenue realized on the marginal sugarcane grown at the end 
of the contract from the acres that were contracted for energy cane 
 
The Shocks 
In previous research it has been shown that a collocated mill of this sort facing the assumed 
production parameters and market conditions will always show a positive NPV in the absence of 
some exogenous shocks to the system.  Given that situation, studying positive shocks to the 
system is of little value as the expansion option will always be exercised and the ROV will be 
zero. Instead, three different types of negative shocks have been designed to study this real 
options problem:  
1.  The price of oil significantly underperforms relative to market forecasts 
2.  The direct federal ethanol subsidy is eliminated 
3.  The price of sugar significantly exceeds expectations 
 
If any of these shocks happens between the time at which the expansion option is purchased and 
the expiration date of the option, it could significantly change the value of the project and could 
change the decision from a “yes” to a “no.”  Cheap oil would significantly depress the price of 
ethanol, thus decreasing revenues and profits of the plant.  The elimination of the subsidy, which 
takes the form of a direct payment to blenders of ethanol, would result in a lower price of ethanol 
paid to producers. Finally, if the price of sugar skyrockets, the price that the plant would have to 
pay for energy cane would also climb steeply, increasing production costs and decreasing profits. 
  Because there is no information that could dictate the probability of any of these shocks 
occurring, they are each modeled over a range of possible probabilities.  The binary values that 
trigger the shocks are then simulated using a Bernoulli distribution, following Richardson 
(2002). 
Results 
In the base case, the probabilities of each of the three shocks are set to zero, and so the scenario 
only analyzes the basic risks inherent in agricultural production and commodity distribution, but 
no uncertainty in market conditions.  In this base case, the Monte Carlo simulated model 
produces a baseline NPV of $149.4 million, with a range of $115 million to $183 million.  The 
full results for the base case are in Table 1.     Because each of the three tested market shocks are truly uncertain, the shocks were 
examined at five different levels of likelihood: 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95%.  Because the 
pattern was found to be consistent across all five levels, only one is presented in full detail in 
Table 2.  For this, the 25% likelihood case, there are three relevant numbers for each shock.  
One, the No-Option value, represents the value of the project when it is considered from the non-
flexible vantage-point offered by traditional NPV analysis, and can be found on Table 2(a).  The 
second value is found on Table 2(b), and is the value of the project when management is able to 
be flexible and allow the option to expand the plant to expire if market conditions change 
between the option purchase and expiration date.  Finally, Table 2(c) has the summary statistics 
for the differences, which describe the value of the real option to expand or not. 
  From these tables, a simple picture can be seen.  Firstly, each of the shocks greatly 
reduces the overall value of the project from the base case, which is to be expected.  Each shock 
is designed to negatively impact the simulated plant either by decreasing the value of its revenue 
streams or increasing the costs of producing them.  In the case of the oil price shock, the No-
Option case has a value of $114.6 million, while the ROA case has a value of $121.1 million.  As 
Table 2(c) shows, this means the real option itself has a value of $6.5 million, or stated another 
way, the plant would be willing to pay up to $6.5 million dollars to gain and preserve the 
flexibility to NOT build the plant if market conditions change.  In addition, the coefficient of 
variation of the simulated values decreases from 54.6 to 41.8 by using the ROA strategy.  So not 
only is the project more valuable when flexibility is incorporated, it also has a lower variability 
in value. 
  For the sugar price shock, a similar picture is seen.  The No-Option value is $121.8 
million, the ROA strategy value is $132 million, and the value of the real option is $10.2.  Also like the oil shock case, the variability of the value drops, from a CV of 40.3 to a CV of 24.  The 
somewhat surprising result comes from the case of dropping the federal ethanol subsidy.  As 
mentioned earlier in the paper, it was assumed that 100% of the cost of the lost subsidy would be 
passed on to the ethanol producers, so this plant is assumed to be feeling the full brunt of that 
policy change.  However, the results show that this shock causes the project to lose the least 
value from the base case.  And more importantly, the value in the No-Option case is higher than 
that of the ROA strategy case, at $133.8 million versus $124.4 million, giving a real option value 
of -$9.4 million.  This negative value implies that the correct value strategy will always be to 
build the expansion plant, regardless of whether or not the ethanol subsidy is dropped between 
the purchase of the option and its expiration.  In addition, the variability in value is lower for the 
No-Option case, so based on this criterion, it is again always optimal to build the plant, 
regardless of the shock state.  Put another way, if the only expected source of uncertainty were 
the state of the ethanol subsidy, the plant would not be willing to pay anything to gain and retain 
the flexibility to not build the expansion. 
  Tables 3(a) through 3(c) have the data for the 25% shock probability case arranged by 
each shock.  Values from the cumulative probability distribution (CDF) for the NPV are also 
summarized, and an interesting picture appears for the oil price shock.  As expected, the values 
above 25% are the same for the Option and Build (no option) cases, and below 25%, the Option 
case values are much higher.  The unexpected thing is what happens right at 25%, where the 
value of the Build case is actually higher.  What this essentially says is that the Build case has a 
much more severe downside than the Option case, and the overall mean expected value is lower, 
but it does bounce back very quickly as you move from worst-case to best-case scenarios, and in 
fact does so more quickly than the Option case. This suggests that the model is extremely sensitive to oil prices, and that care should be taken with respect to forecasting those prices and 
analyzing the uncertainty around them. 
  Finally, Table 4 has the real option values for each shock across each level of likelihood.  
The pattern is consistent across all levels.  The value is positive and increasing with probability 
for the oil and sugar price shocks, and negative and decreasing for the ethanol subsidy shock. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The essential goal of this research was to determine whether or not real options analysis could be 
useful to the study of advanced biofuel production under conditions of uncertainty.  The base 
plant used was a cellulosic ethanol plant collocated with a sugar mill in south Louisiana.  The 
real option tested was an option to expand capacity by contracting for additional guaranteed 
feedstock and then deciding whether to build two years later. 
The other goal of the research was to put the real options strategy to the test by 
introducing some sources of uncertainty into the model. In order to test the plant‟s response to 
uncertainty in market conditions, we tested three different shocks that seem like plausible 
candidates for market disruption.  Shocks to oil prices and sugar prices both worked as expected, 
sharply reducing the value of the project while also showing a strong positive value for the use of 
the real options strategy.  However, the tested scenario in which the federal ethanol subsidy was 
completely taken away showed a quite different picture.  This shock reduced the value of the 
project far less than the other two, and the option to not build proved to always be the wrong 
strategic move.  On the one hand, this scenario proved that using a real options analysis approach 
is not necessarily a better method of strategic decision making, or at least that an analyst must be 
very careful about examining trigger values before developing decision strategies.  On the other hand, this scenario also lends itself to a very interesting interpretation with regard to renewable 
energy policy.  It has been strongly argued by interested parties that the ethanol industry needs 
subsidies and other government support due to its status as an infant industry, and this argument 
seems to apply even more to the far-newer sub-industry of cellulosic ethanol production.  
However, given the assumptions in this model, it appears that at least one federal ethanol policy, 
the blender‟s per-gallon credit, is not actually needed for an ethanol producer to be able to 
operate profitably.  There are other direct and indirect supports for the industry that were not 
tested, but the blender‟s credit is the one that is easiest to understand and dismantle, as it is a 
simple per-gallon credit.  This finding does not mean that the credit is necessarily unneeded, of 
course.  It may well be that the loss of this credit would negatively impact the industry 
somewhere further down the supply chain, or would have some sort of transformative effect on 
the supply and/or demand functions of the industry.  But in the limited scope of this study, the 
findings do indicate that the blender‟s credit is not likely to be a decision point upon which 
cellulosic ethanol producers‟ strategic choices should turn. 
  Further study needs to be done on other sources of uncertainty, especially where 
policy decisions are concerned.  If the blender‟s credit really doesn‟t have a large impact on the 
production of ethanol, other energy and fuel policies might bear closer examination as well.  In 
addition, other types of options need to be explored.  In the current model, the plant operator has 
a single decision window of about two years, in between signing the contract and starting 
construction.  In reality, the operator would thereafter have a continuous series of decisions about 
whether to stay in operation, temporarily shut down, or close the plant and sell off assets.  These 
decisions can also be represented by real options, and hence could change the value of the 
project under certain scenarios. Other possible options might arise if the use of energy cane were less restrictive.  As it stands now, energy cane could profitably used only for the production of 
cellulosic ethanol, and so all contracting decisions hinge on ethanol production.  If however, 
there were alternative uses for the crop, each decision would grow more complicated, and the 
value of contracting would likely change depending on the relative value of alternative uses. 
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YearTable 1: The Base Case With No Shocks 
No Shocks - Base Case 
Mean  $149,439,106.36  
StDev  $11,146,345.48  
CV  7.46  
Min  $115,045,190.36  
Max  $183,285,156.49  
   Table 2:  Summary of the 25% Shock Case 
Table 2(a): Summary of the No-Option (NPV) case 
  No-Option case at 25% chance of shocks 
  Oil Price  Eth Subsidy  Sugar Price 
Mean  $114,664,191.95   $133,888,426.14   $121,870,892.78  
StDev  $62,573,188.42   $29,199,068.74   $49,121,521.98  
CV  54.5708188  21.80850846  40.30619688 
Min  ($50,666,344.00)  $61,554,449.20   $8,833,130.69  
Max  $183,285,156.49   $183,285,156.49   $183,285,156.49  
 
Table 2(b): Summary of the Real Options case 
  Real Option Strategy at 25% chance of shocks 
  Oil Price  Eth Subsidy  Sugar Price 
Mean  $121,164,548.42   $124,404,546.56   $132,081,189.57  
StDev   $    50,679,214.14    $    44,606,818.48    $     31,750,323.47  
CV  41.82676765  35.85626066  24.03848994 
Min  $8,288,121.95   $35,582,828.26   $65,197,764.13  
Max  $183,285,156.49   $183,285,156.49   $183,285,156.49  
 
Table 2(c): Summary of the values of the Real Options under each shock at 25% 
  Summary Stats of Differences at 25% shock 
  Oil Price  Eth Subsidy  Sugar Price 
Mean  $6,500,356.47   ($9,483,879.57)  $10,210,296.79  
StDev  $14,005,972.16   $16,898,841.40   $18,227,060.51  
CV  215.4646781  178.1849006  178.5164612 
Min  ($26,023,711.57)  ($58,374,558.60)  $0.00  
Max  $69,180,789.53   $0.00   $58,967,806.28  
   Table 3: The 25% Case, By Each Shock 
 
Table 3(a): The Oil Price Shock at 25% 
Oil Price Shock 
   Build  Option  difference 
min  ($50,666,344.00)  $8,288,121.95   $58,954,465.95  
5%  ($7,242,975.26)  $28,817,628.62   $36,060,603.88  
25%  $80,402,098.92   $54,378,387.35   ($26,023,711.57) 
50%  $144,735,603.09   $144,735,603.09   $0.00  
75%  $154,606,222.34   $154,606,222.34   $0.00  
95%  $167,547,365.34   $167,547,365.34   $0.00  
mean  $114,664,191.95   $121,164,548.42   $6,500,356.47  
SD  $62,573,188.42   $50,679,214.14   ($11,893,974.28) 
CV  54.57   41.83   (12.74) 
 
Table 3(b): The Ethanol Subsidy Shock at 25% 
Ethanol Subsidy 
   Build  Option  difference 
min  $61,554,449.20   $35,582,828.26   ($25,971,620.94) 
5%  $78,933,371.76   $44,648,930.25   ($34,284,441.51) 
25%  $115,505,737.72   $60,533,875.96   ($54,971,861.76) 
50%  $144,309,122.71   $144,309,122.71   $0.00  
75%  $154,298,488.36   $154,298,488.36   $0.00  
95%  $166,591,338.32   $166,591,338.32   $0.00  
mean  $133,888,426.14   $124,404,546.56   ($9,483,879.57) 
SD  $29,199,068.74   $44,606,818.48   $15,407,749.75  
CV  21.81   35.86   14.05  
 
Table 3(c): The Sugar Price Shock at 25% 
Sugar Price Shock 
   Build  Option  difference 
min  $8,833,130.69   $65,197,764.13   $56,364,633.44  
5%  $29,504,819.68   $75,507,193.44   $46,002,373.76  
25%  $67,824,297.93   $92,050,860.18   $24,226,562.25  
50%  $144,551,679.84   $144,551,679.84   $0.00  
75%  $154,410,940.87   $154,410,940.87   $0.00  
95%  $166,591,338.32   $166,591,338.32   $0.00  
mean  $121,870,892.78   $132,081,189.57   $10,210,296.79  
SD  $49,121,521.98   $31,750,323.47   ($17,371,198.52) 
CV  40.31   24.04   (16.27) 
   Table 4: Summary Matrix of Shock Probabilities 
Probability  OIL  Eth Subsidy  Sugar 
0.05  $1,485,605.66   ($1,972,842.23)  $2,055,793.79  
0.25  $6,500,356.47   ($9,483,879.57)  $10,210,296.79  
0.5  $13,002,485.74   ($18,730,333.16)  $20,244,192.69  
0.75  $19,634,862.90   ($28,131,168.76)  $30,636,452.85  
0.95  $24,365,466.58   ($35,508,001.55)  $38,813,195.62  
 
   Appendix A 
1.  Tons of sugarcane processed per day 
  A function of sugarcane yield/acre.  Acres are held constant. 
2.  Sugar recovery (CRS) 
  Simulated with an empirical distribution based on 20 years of historical data 
3.  Growers‟ share of raw sugar and molasses 
  Held constant at 2009 level 
4.  Market prices of raw sugar and molasses 
  Sugar  price  is  part  of  the  MVE  model,  molasses  is  simulated  with  a  GRKS 
distribution 
5.  Market price of ethanol 
  Part of the MVE 
6.  Factory grinding rate (tons per hour/day) 
  Starts at current representative 12000 tons/day, increases at 1% per year 
7.  Grinding cost per day (variable cost) 
  Inflated at 1% per year 
8.  Cane freight expenses (variable cost) 
  Inflated at 1% per year 
9.  Sugar freight expenses (variable cost) 
  Inflated at 1% per year 
10. Offseason expenses (fixed cost)  
  Inflated at 1% per year 
11. Employee expenses (fixed cost)  
  Inflated at 1% per year 
12. Administrative expenses (fixed cost)  
  Inflated at 1% per year 
13. Depreciation expenses (fixed cost)  
  Inflated at 1% per year 
   Appendix B 
SALES =    (TONS  x  TRS  x  LQF  x  SP)    (2) 
+  (TONS  x  MOL/TON  x  MP)  
+ (TONS x TRS x LQF x 3STRSUG x CONVFAC x EP) 
+ (TONS x BAGEX x ETH/BAG x EP) 
 
where    TONS = tons of sugarcane processed (tons) 
    TRS = theoretical recoverable sugar (lbs/ton) 
    LQF = liquidation factor (%) 
    SP = raw sugar market price ($/lb) 
    MOL/TON = molasses production rate (gal/ton) 
    MP = molasses market price ($/gal) 
    3STRSUG = third strike sugar percentage (%) 
    CONVFAC = ethanol conversion factor (gal/lb) 
    EP = ethanol price 
BAGEX = Excess Bagasse Percentage (dry ton rate) 
ETH/BAG = gallons of ethanol per dry ton of bagasse (gal/ton) 
COSTOFSALES =     
    [(TONS  x  TRS  x  LQF  x  SP  x  GSHRS)      (3) 
    + (TONS  x  MOL/TON  x  MP  x  GSHRM)] 
    + [TONS  x  CANEFREIGHT] 
    + [TONS  x  SUGFREIGHT] 
    + DENATURANT 
 
where    TONS = tons of sugarcane processed (tons) 
    TRS = theoretical recoverable sugar (lbs/ton) 
    LQF = liquidation factor (%) 
    SP = raw sugar market price ($/lb) 
    GSHRS = grower‟s share of sugar 
    MOL/TON = molasses production rate (gal/ton) 
    MP = molasses market price ($/gal) 
    GSHRM = grower‟s share of molasses 
    CANEFREIGHT = hauling rate for sugarcane ($/ton) 
    SUGFREIGHT = raw sugar freight rate ($/ton)  
    DENATURANT = blended at 4.76% of eth. volume (gal) 
 
FACTORYEXPENSES =    (4) 
GRINDING COSTS + OFFSEASON COSTS  
+  EMPLOY COSTS  + ADMIN COSTS  
+  DEPREC COSTS + COETHCOSTS + CELLETHCOSTS 
 
GRINDING COSTS = [(TONS/GRDRATE)  x  GRDCOST]  (4.1) 
COETH COSTS = COETH EMPLOY + COETH ADMIN + COETH DEPREC  (4.2) 
CELLETH COSTS =   ETH EMPLOY + ETH ADMIN + ETH DEPREC      (4.3) 
 
where    TONS = tons of sugarcane processed (tons)     GRDRATE = grinding rate per day (tons/day) 
    GRDCOST = grinding cost per day ($/day) 
    OFFSEASON = off season expenses ($/season) 
    EMPLOY = employee expenses ($/season) 
    ADMIN = administrative expenses ($/season) 
    DEPREC = depreciation expenses ($/season) 
      COETH EMPLOY = employee expenses for  conv. ethanol ($/season)  
      COETH ADMIN = admin. expenses for conv. ethanol ($/season) 
      COETH DEPREC = depreciation for conv. ethanol ($/season) 
 
Note: all equations in italics only apply for the case where a cellulosic ethanol facility is built 
 
 
 